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Foreword

In December 1976, a study entitled The Accounting Establishment
was released by the Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and
Management of the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs.
The study was prepared by the staff of the Subcommittee. “The
major purpose of this study,” according to Subcommittee Chairman
Lee Metcalf, “is to provide Congress and the public with an under
standing of the various private organizations and Federal agencies
involved in establishing and administering accounting practices which
have substantial impact on Federal policies and programs, as well as
private economic decisions.”
On March 1, 1977, Senator Sam Nunn, of Georgia, a member of
the Subcommittee, informed AICPA Board Chairman Michael N.
Chetkovich that hearings on the accounting profession were scheduled
for this spring and asked Mr. Chetkovich for comments on the report
as a whole, “with particular emphasis on its recommendations.”
This request resulted in the following memorandum of comment
on the staff study and in the accompanying transmittal letter in which
the memorandum is briefly summarized.

E. O l s o n , President
American Institute of CPAs
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(212) 57 5-62 00

March 28, 1977
The Honorable Sam Nunn
United States Senate
110 Russell Senate Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator Nunn:
Re: The Staff Study of the Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting and
Management, U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
entitled “ The Accounting Establishment”
Thank you for the opportunity to present this preliminary response on
behalf of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (the
“ Institute” ) to the Staff Study of the Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting
and Management of the Committee on Governmental Affairs (the “ staff
study” ) entitled “ The Accounting Establishment.” Attached is a more
detailed response to the issues raised by the staff study. We expect to
elaborate in later submissions and in testimony at the hearings we
understand are planned by the Subcommittee.
The Institute is a voluntary association consisting of approximately 130,000
certified public accountants and is the largest organization of accountants
in the world. It has been the principal force for the last 75 years in
developing, strengthening and refining financial accounting and auditing
standards.
The purpose of this letter and the accompanying memorandum is to
discuss the role of the accounting profession with respect to the
credibility of financial statements prepared by management and provided
to investors, creditors and the public; to outline the history of the
continuing efforts of the profession to strengthen this role; and to describe
the efforts and resources presently dedicated to the continuing solution
of the evolving problems in the financial reporting process.
We believe that this analysis will demonstrate that the accounting
profession has acted responsibly in the past and has the will and capability
to deal with problems relating to financial reporting in the future and that
the transfer of the standard-setting responsibility to governmental hands
While this response has been approved by the Board of Directors of the
Institute, it does not purport to reflect the views of all 130,000 members.

1

would impede, rather than further, the resolution of such problems. Also,
we believe that the record of the profession refutes the principal charges
leveled at the Institute, the accounting profession, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission in the staff
study and shows that such charges are not supported by the study.
Events of recent years have focused attention on the importance of audited
financial statements in our economy. It has been recognized as never
before that these statements are of critical importance to investors,
creditors and the public; as a consequence, the performance of those
associated with them is a matter of legitimate public concern. This period
has seen huge and dramatic corporate failures and cunning and wellpublicized frauds perpetrated on investors (and auditors) by unscrupulous
promoters. These events have given rise to vast amounts of litigation
against everyone involved in the corporate process— officers, directors,
attorneys, accountants— and charges of improper accounting and auditing.
It is not surprising that public accountants have been the targets of such
attention since they are important to the process of financial disclosure.
Much of the criticism has its origins in the misconception that financial
statements are prepared by auditors. The preparation of financial
statements is the responsibility of management; the auditor’s responsibility
is to examine them for conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles. Also, there is a lack of understanding of the limits imposed by
cost and other considerations and of the extent of assurance auditors
can reasonably give with respect to financial statements.
The Institute does not assert that auditors have been completely without
blame in some of the cases that are mentioned in the staff study or that the
concerns expressed in the staff study are totally groundless; there are
problems in financial reporting that must be resolved. However, a fair
consideration of those cases and those concerns requires also a fair
consideration of the substantial efforts which the profession has made and
is continuing to make to avoid repetitions of past problems, as well as to
anticipate new problems. It should be recognized that as a result of these
efforts the quality of financial reporting in the United States is better
than anywhere else in the world.
The more important of these efforts are described in the attached
memorandum of which the following is a brief summary:
1. Financial Accounting Standards. At the present time financial
accounting standards (sometimes referred to as accounting principles)
are being developed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).
Headquartered in Stamford, Connecticut, it was established some four
years ago in response to recommendations of a committee chaired by
Francis M. Wheat, Esq., formerly a commissioner of the Securities and
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Exchange Commission. That committee, which included only a minority of
practicing CPAs, concluded unequivocally that accounting standard setting
should take place in the private sector. The FASB engages in extensive
research and thus far has issued 20 exposure drafts of proposed standards
and has published some 14 accounting standards, 18 interpretations and
13 discussion memoranda and has held 14 public hearings. It has an
extensive agenda. Some 12 items are under study. This production has
not only been voluminous, but it has also effected significant changes in
accounting. The Board’s approach has been thoughtful, careful, and
diligent, and there is every reason to believe that given reasonable time it
will resolve the presently recognized major issues pertaining to financial
accounting standards and those that emerge in the future. To help assure
the continuing effectiveness of the Board, the trustees of the Financial
Accounting Foundation, the entity which secures the financing for the
Board and generally oversees its activities, are making an in-depth review
of the structure and operations of the Board, which is to be completed
very shortly.
The staff study alleges that the SEC has improperly delegated its authority
over accounting matters to the profession. It is true that the SEC has
allowed the profession to take the initiative in establishing financial
accounting standards. However, the record shows that the SEC has not
hesitated to step in and take action on its own whenever it has felt that this
procedure was not yielding satisfactory results. In addition, the SEC
makes very effective use of the ample opportunities for expressing its
views to the standard-setting bodies. The arrangement complained of
in the staff study has existed for almost 40 years without any public dissent
from any SEC chairman, commissioner or chief accountant and with the
full knowledge of all sectors including the Congress. Furthermore, there is
no showing that a direct exercise of authority by the Commission during
this time would have yielded higher or better standards.
2. Auditing Standards. Audits provide reasonable assurance that matters
are as represented in financial statements. Auditing standards are the
rules that regulate the manner in which financial statements are examined
by independent auditors and the manner in which auditors express their
opinions on such statements. Auditing standards are formulated by
the Auditing Standards Executive Committee, a senior committee of the
Institute. These standards are being developed and refined on a
continuing basis, thus providing prompt response to constantly changing
needs. The present activity is vigorous and fruitful. Also it is fair to
observe that many of the deficiencies alleged against auditors do not stem
from shortcomings in auditing standards.
Many forces are operating to strengthen auditing standards and
procedures and to decrease the possibility of misleading audited
financial statements.
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a. An independent commission on auditors’ responsibilities appointed
by the Institute in October 1974 is headed by a former chairman
of the SEC (three of the seven members are practicing accountants;
the others are a lawyer, a businessman, a financial analyst, and
an educator). The commission expects to publish a preliminary
report by April 1 of this year; this report is expected to call for
various measures to be undertaken to strengthen the audit function;
b. Accounting firms, as a consequence of the increasing complexity
of business transactions and sensitivity to rising public expectations,
have strengthened their internal quality controls, supervision,
training and audit procedures; and
c. Most large firms have arranged to have their practices and
procedures reviewed by another firm or a panel appointed by the
Institute to evaluate the adequacy of their quality control procedures.
3. Independence. Auditors are subject to stringent rules promulgated
by the Institute, state boards of accountancy, state societies of certified
public accountants, the SEC and other federal agencies regulating the
relationship between the auditors and their clients. These rules are
designed to assure independence from clients. With very few exceptions
the cases cited as instances of audit failure do not involve the slightest
evidence that lack of independence was a factor.
The staff study asserts that the independence of auditors is impaired by
their performance of certain services, such as management advisory
services, tax advice, and the like. There is no evidence that the
performance of these services has compromised any auditor; on the
contrary, the performance of such services generally assists the auditor by
affording him an opportunity to learn more about the client, its internal
controls, the quality of its personnel and its operations, knowledge that is
helpful to the performance of the audit function.
Contrary to the suggestion of the staff study, the testifying by accountants
on their own behalf before congressional committees and other public
bodies does not evidence impaired independence. To deny auditors the
opportunity to assist in the development of policy would be to deny them
a basic right and would deprive policy makers of valuable assistance and
advice. Moreover, clients’ opinions vary; thus, while an auditor’s testimony
may please some clients, it often may displease others.
Auditor independence has been strengthened by the SEC requirement that
changes of auditors be publicly reported and disagreements about
accounting principles between the departing auditor and the client be
disclosed. Reports filed with the SEC indicate that in five years, 165
changes of auditors involving disagreements over accounting principles
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have occurred. In addition, there have been innumerable instances where
clients have agreed to modify their financial statements at the insistence
of the auditors without a change in auditors taking place.
Accounting firms have developed sophisticated systems to assure
compliance with standards of independence and these standards are
rigidly enforced. Furthermore, the growth in the number of audit
committees made up of outside directors (after July 1, 1978, every
company with securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange must
have such a committee) provides a means for auditors to resolve auditing
problems with non-management directors.
4. Domination. The staff study asserts that the AICPA and the accounting
profession are dominated by the “ Big Eight” accounting firms. The facts
and figures contradict this charge. Members of the “ Big Eight” firms are
one-third or less of the Institute Council, its ultimate policy-making body,
and of the Board of Directors. Also, they do not dominate the senior
technical committees; for instance, members affiliated with “ Big Eight”
firms on one of the most important Institute committees (the Auditing
Standards Executive Committee, which is singled out for discussion in the
staff report) are less than a majority (8 out of 21). Any proposal to carry
in this Committee must receive a two-thirds vote. Of course, the fact
is that the “ Big Eight” firms are not a monolith; on most substantive
professional issues, there are strong differences of opinion among them.
These large firms audit a high proportion of publicly held companies.
They naturally have a keen interest in committees of the Institute working
on the problems of auditing such companies, and their partners have much
to offer to the work of those committees. Furthermore, because of their
size, they often are better able to commit personnel and resources to the
voluntary work of the Institute. Finally, there is no showing whatsoever that
the presence in relatively large numbers of partners of the “ Big Eight”
firms on Institute committees has operated to the detriment of the public
interest or the profession.
5. Liability. The staff study proposes legislative reversal of the 1976
Supreme Court decision in Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, which held that to
sustain an action for damages under the SEC’s Rule 10b-5 a misconduct
greater than simple negligence must be alleged and shown. The staff
study discussion of this matter overlooks the fact that auditors continue
to be liable for negligence in connection with registration statements
under the Securities Act of 1933; that, according to some courts
of appeal, they continue to be liable for recklessness and similar
misconduct in connection with damages arising out of market transactions;
that substantial liabilities may still accrue against them as evidenced by
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the Equity Funding settlement ($39 million contributed by the auditors
or their insurers); and that some courts of appeal have held that negligence
is sufficient to sustain an action by the SEC.
6. Concentration. The staff study asserts that there is undue concentration
in the accounting profession because a large percentage of the audits
of listed companies are done by the “ Big Eight’’ firms. Audits of publicly
held companies frequently require services in tens, and in some cases,
hundreds, of locations. Thus the emergence of large accounting firms is
substantially attributable to the nature of demands for auditing services
which have developed as American corporations have grown larger and
expanded the scope of their operations.
7. Disciplinary Matters. The staff study has criticized the Institute’s efforts
to appropriately discipline its members for misdeeds.
It is true that relatively few disciplinary matters stemming from highly
publicized cases have been concluded. A large number are pending since
the Institute has considered it unwise and potentially unfair to carry
through disciplinary proceedings against allegedly errant CPAs while civil
litigation and SEC proceedings were pending. The standards for
determining whether a member of the Institute should be subjected to
disciplinary measures are higher than those which characterize civil
litigation or an SEC proceeding. Consequently a determination by the
Institute to discipline a member could seriously prejudice that member in
related proceedings. In all cases where it appears that a member is
charged with some misdeed— and this includes virtually all instances in
which members are charged in court or before the SEC with misconduct—
a proceeding is commenced against him and it is processed to conclusion
as soon as the other proceedings have terminated.
In appraising the adequacy of regulation of the profession it must be
recognized that the Institute is by no means the only discipline to which
accountants are subject; state licensing authorities, state CPA societies,
the SEC and other governmental agencies, and private litigation provide
other disciplinary restraints which in their totality are very formidable.
Conclusion. An examination of the staff study discloses a significant gap
between the purported evidence and the recommendations. Furthermore
there is a total lack of evidence that adoption of the recommendations in
the staff study would remedy any of the alleged faults.
Most important, the staff study fails to recognize the tremendous efforts
that are being made by the accounting profession to eliminate as far as
humanly possible the causes of misleading financial statements./The
Financial Accounting Standards Board, in existence less than four years,
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is moving vigorously to resolve problems that have plagued issuers and
accountants for generations. The Auditing Standards Executive Committee
is persistently seeking to strengthen standards and to clarify the
responsibilities of auditors; it is expected that the recommendations of
the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, appointed by the Institute
and headed by former SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen, will go far to assist
this effort. As a consequence of the sensitivity of the profession to public
needs, concerns, and expectations, greater vigilance on the part of the
SEC, and extensive litigation, accounting firms at great cost have
strengthened their systems of quality control and their means of
avoiding errors.
We respectfully suggest that imposing a vast new scheme of federal
regulation on the accounting profession is unnecessary. We submit that
the evidence is clear that the profession has the competence, the incentive,
and the desire to effect any changes necessary to provide enhanced
reliability of financial reports.
Respectfully submitted,

Michael N. Chetkovich
Chairman of the Board

cc: Members of the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
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Memorandum of Comment
by the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants
on the Study by the Staff of the
Subcommittee on Reports,
Accounting and Management,
U.S. Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, Entitled
“The Accounting Establishment”

IN TR O D U C TIO N
The purpose of this memorandum is to respond to the recommendations
presented in the study by the staff of the Subcommittee on Reports, Ac
counting and Management of the U.S. Senate Committee on Govern
mental Affairs, entitled “The Accounting Establishment.” In so doing it
will discuss the manner in which financial accounting and auditing stand
ards are established in this country, the ways in which the independence of
auditors is assured, and the forces, both public and private, that seek to
assure the integrity of the financial reporting process. We believe this dis
cussion will establish that there are presently in place in the accounting
profession mechanisms, methods, and people that are fully capable of
providing to the American people the assurances they want and need
concerning the integrity of financial statements prepared by American
business. Furthermore, this entire process is effectively overseen in the
public interest by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which has been
an active participant in the development of accounting standards since
1934.
This is not to deny the legitimacy of the concerns which motivated the
staff study. In the wake of such dramatic business failures as Penn Central
and such blatant management frauds as Equity Funding, National Student
Marketing, and Stirling Homex, the demands for higher standards for all
those concerned with the corporate process in this country—officers, direc
tors, attorneys, auditors—have been insistent and proper.

While this memorandum has been approved by the Board of Directors of the
Institute, it does not purport to reflect the views of all 130,000 members of the
Institute.
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No systems, in accounting or any other line of endeavor, can ever insure
against human shortcomings; however, the risks of breakdowns in financial
reporting are being steadily and speedily reduced. We hope that this
memorandum will demonstrate the seriousness, the extensiveness, the vigor,
and the success of the profession’s efforts to improve financial reporting.
And we believe that a federal initiative at this time would impede, if not
destroy, these efforts and needlessly involve the federal government in
the affairs of the profession.
Entirely apart from the merits of the charges made with respect to the
past conduct of members of the accounting profession, a careful reading
of the staff study shows no relationship between the charges against the
profession, its bodies, and the SEC, and the business failures and misleading
financial statements mentioned. Moreover, there is no evidence that the
tight federal control of the profession proposed by the staff study would
reduce hazards to the public.
Finally, this memorandum is not intended to present a point-by-point
contradiction of incorrect information contained in the staff study or dispute
each of the allegations contained in it; that will be done in the course of
the upcoming hearings, submissions of other parties, and possible future
memoranda from the Institute.

THE A M E R IC A N INSTITUTE OF
CERTIFIED PUBLIC A C C O U N T A N T S
This memorandum is submitted by the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (the Institute). The Institute is the national pro
fessional organization of certified public accountants. Certified public
accountants (CPAs) are accountants who have completed extensive educa
tional requirements and have passed a series of complex uniform examina
tions prepared by the Institute and administered by the accountancy boards
in the various states. These accountants are licensed by the individual states
and upon being so licensed may hold themselves out as “certified public
accountants.”
The Institute has about 130,000 members in all states of the Union.
While there is no legal requirement that certified public accountants be
members of the Institute, a very large majority of them are. The Institute
conducts extensive educational programs to assist members in upgrading
their skills and in keeping current with developments in the profession.
The ultimate policy-making body of the Institute is the Council, con
sisting of 255 members selected in part by state CPA societies and in part
by election at large; other members serve by reason of their present or
12

past offices in the Institute. The Board of Directors, a body of 18 members,
has the continuing responsibility for the conduct of the Institute’s affairs.

SU M M A R Y OF THE STAFF ST U D Y
A N D QUESTIONS RAISED
The staff study, while it makes a multitude of allegations and a number of
recommendations, nonetheless may be briefly summarized. It alleges that
the entire financial accounting and reporting process in the United States
is dominated by a group of 8 accounting firms (referred to as the “Big
Eight”), aided by another 7 firms smaller in size than the “Big Eight.”
These 15 firms perform auditing services for a high proportion of the
companies listed on the New York and American Stock Exchanges. The
staff study charges that, while accountants associated with these firms
account for only 11 or 12 percent of the nation’s certified public accoun
tants, they dominate the accounting profession and its principal organiza
tion, the Institute, by their membership on the Institute’s governing and
technical bodies. By domination of the Institute, it is alleged, they dominate
the Financial Accounting Foundation, which is the “parent” body of the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). The FASB establishes
financial accounting principles in the United States. Thus, through this
chain, it is asserted, the “Big Eight” dominate the establishment of ac
counting principles.
The staff study alleges that the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the SEC) has abdicated its statutory obligations by permitting the account
ing profession to establish accounting principles and has by various
actions encouraged this activity in the private sector.
The staff study alleges that accountants are not independent of their
clients, that they have failed to assure that the financial statements issued
to the public are accurate and reliable, and that therefore various drastic
measures should be taken to assure public accountability by the profession.
Basically, the staff study poses the following questions to which we will
respond (parenthetical references are to the numbered recommendations
set forth in pages 20 to 24 of the staff study). The Institute has not re
sponded to those recommendations as to which others might more appro
priately comment.
1.
Are present financial accounting standards (sometimes called ac
counting principles) and the process by which they are established—private
sector initiative accompanied by SEC oversight—adequate for protection
of the public? (Recommendations 1, 2, 5, and 11.)
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2. Are present auditing standards and the process by which they are
established adequate for protection of the public? (Recommendations 6,
7, 8, and 10.)
3. Are auditors sufficiently independent of their clients? (Recommenda
tion 8.)
4. Are the Institute and the accounting profession dominated by the
large accounting firms? (Recommendations 4 and 12.)
5. Are present standards for determining the liability of auditors to
public investors fair and sufficiently protective of the public? (Recom
mendation 3.)
6. Is there excessive concentration in the supply of auditing and ac
counting services to large publicly owned corporations? (Recommendations
4 and 12.)
7. Is the disciplinary process that impacts the accounting profession
sufficient? (Recommendations 8 and 14.)
8. Should the federal government refuse to engage for consulting
work all firms that do auditing work for the government? (Recommenda
tion 13.)

DISCUSSION
1. Are present financial accounting standards (sometimes called
accounting principles) and the process by which they are
established— private sector initiative accompanied by SEC
oversight— adequate for protection of the public?

(Recommendations 1, 2, 5, and 11.)
The staff study charges that the process by which financial accounting
standards are established is dominated by the “Big Eight” and that the
failure of the profession and the SEC to insist upon elimination of alterna
tive financial accounting standards has resulted in financial statements that
are misleading to investors.
In the simplest terms, financial accounting standards are the rules
governing how the information about business transactions is expressed
and recorded in numbers, how the numbers are aggregated and arrayed,
how they are reported, and how they are supplemented with textual dis
closure to present the financial position of an enterprise at a particular
moment in time, the results of its operations for a defined period, and the
changes in its financial position during such period. Accounting is the
process of applying financial accounting standards to the information
about individual business transactions to produce financial statements which
14

aggregate the information about individual transactions in an orderly
manner. Accountants, therefore, are those who have specialized pro
ficiency in the accounting process.
The accounting process necessarily involves making innumerable judg
ments and estimates—the useful life of fixed assets such as a factory, and
of intangible assets such as acquired goodwill, the collectibility of accounts
receivables, the utility of inventories, and the appropriateness of tax ac
cruals. This circumstance belies the common belief that financial statements
are precise and exact, a notion that frequently results in criticisms of
accountants when reasonable estimates prove in hindsight to have been off
the mark.
The limitations of accounting and the accounting process were remarked
upon recently by Professor George H. Sorter, chairman of the Department
of Accounting, Graduate School of Business Administration, New York
University:
Misconceptions about accounting abound. Totally unrealistic expectations
of accounting’s role are held by many, including those that should know
better. . . . Many expect accounting reports to “reveal” the value of a
company, to establish the health or sickness of a company, to signal
whether a stock is a good or bad investment. But that is not and cannot
be the proper role of accounting. . . .
Accounting provides complex information to be used in conjunction with
other information. Decision makers then, based on their individual judg
ments, individual preferences and individual expectations, determine the
value, health and prospects of a company project. . . .
It is somewhat strange that a world that has reluctantly accepted a prob
lematic weather forecast expects accounting reports to provide definitive
forecasts of whether it will rain or shine on a particular company. . . .
N ot all significant economic activities can be communicated by accounting
reports, and the user, in order not to be misled, must know which activities
are included (N ew York Times, March 6, 1977, Sec. 3, p. 12).

Financial reporting standards are not “laws” or “givens” waiting to be
discovered by a discerning eye, like the laws of physical science. Financial
accounting standards are conventions—ways agreed on or determined by
custom or authority— of measuring, combining, and stating information
about business transactions. There is no such thing as an absolutely right
or an absolutely wrong financial accounting standard. There will never
be a system of financial accounting standards that is complete and im
mutable. There are continuing changes in the business practices that pro15

duce the information which in turn is organized and communicated by
the application of financial accounting standards. For example, when
franchising became a common business practice, franchisors applied
then accepted accounting practices to increase income by immediately
including franchise fees payable in the future. New financial accounting
standards had to be developed to arrange the resulting information and
communicate it in a manner that was not misleading— and standards
were established by publication of an authoritative Institute guide. Until
new standards were developed and promulgated, accountants relied on
existing standards which had not been designed to deal with these innova
tions, since previously they had not been encountered frequently.
Before the 1930s, the efforts of the accounting profession to establish
financial accounting standards received little support from other private or
governmental groups. However, even before the 1929 crash, but with
accelerating speed thereafter, members of the accounting profession were
joined by the New York Stock Exchange and others in efforts to improve
the integrity of published financial statements. The Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 hastened and strengthened this
process by giving to the newborn Securities and Exchange Commission
broad powers to prescribe the content and forms of presentation of financial
information in documents filed with it.
In 1938, after considerable study and internal debate, the SEC adopted
Accounting Series Release No. 4. This stated that the Commission would
accept in filings with it financial statements prepared in accordance with
standards for which there was substantial authoritative support if the Com
mission had not expressed a contrary policy. In 1939 the Committee on
Accounting Procedures was organized by the Institute for the explicit
purpose of developing accounting principles.
By the mid-fifties, the absence of sufficient research and a theoretical
framework was recognized as hampering the work of the Committee. The
Accounting Principles Board (the APB) was launched by the Institute in
1959 with a mandate that placed heavy emphasis on research and the
articulation of fundamentals. Largely as a result of pressures for the
resolution of urgent practical day-to-day problems, compliance with the
research portion of its mandate gradually diminished, as is described by the
Report of the Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles issued in
March 1972 (pp. 29-35). Out of this report came the Financial Accounting
Standards Board. It is fair to say that with respect to every major criticism
leveled at the APB a meaningful response was incorporated in the makeup
and the procedures of the FASB.
This shift of responsibility for the establishment of accounting standards
16

represented a major, even revolutionary, shift. The Institute and practicing
accountants no longer have final authority over the establishment of ac
counting standards. This authority now rests with the FASB, which was
intended to be, and is, independent of the Institute. Under FASB proce
dures, the Institute is no different from any other group having opinions
about financial accounting standards: It responds to FASB invitations to
comment and is often disappointed, as are others, that its advice does not
prevail.
Less than four years since its creation, the FASB is now being assailed
by impatient critics. Its purported shortcomings, such as alleged slowness
in coming to grips with important issues, are well publicized. Unfortunately,
less well publicized have been its achievements. It has issued 20 drafts of
proposed Statements, 14 Statements, 13 discussion memoranda, 18 Inter
pretations and has held 14 public hearings. This might be compared with
the work of the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB), which was
created in 1970 and on which the staff study has commented favorably: 18
drafts of proposed Standards, 14 Standards, 2 Interpretations, and one
public hearing to evaluate Standards issued previously. This is not to
suggest that the record of the CASB is to be criticized: The comparison
simply points up the laudable accomplishments of the FASB.
Further indication of the profession’s earnest efforts to develop financial
accounting standards is the fact that the FASB’s predecessors published 82
Opinions and Bulletins, as well as numerous Interpretations. These, to
gether with the FASB’s pronouncements, constitute the most extensive
body of authoritative pronouncements on financial accounting standards
in the world.
These achievements have by no means been easy. The FASB’s second
Statement, requiring the immediate write-off of research and development
costs, although highly controversial, was, in the eyes of most, courageous.
Statement No. 8, which requires immediate reflection of the impact of
currency fluctuations on financial positions and operations, has drawn
almost unanimous criticism from those most affected—American multina
tional enterprises. These and other examples amply demonstrate the
independence of the FASB in its decision making. The active agenda of
the Board is studded with controversial and difficult topics: A 360-page
discussion memorandum on the conceptual framework for financial ac
counting and reporting has been published, and a 400-page discussion
memorandum on accounting and reporting for extractive industries has
also been published; public hearings have been scheduled on both of these
problems.
The Institute is not aware of any evidence that any Statement or Inter
pretation has been influenced by the prior affiliations of Board members,
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by their membership in the Institute, by dependence of the FASB on the
Financial Accounting Foundation for fund raising, by members’ expecta
tions of future employment in the profession, or by any other consideration
antagonistic to sound financial reporting.
When the alleged shortcomings of the FASB are fully cataloged, there
is no evidence that the job of determining financial accounting standards
could better be done by a governmental body. Would the job be done
more quickly? If so, it would be at the expense of the careful research,
analysis, and opportunity for public hearings that have preceded FASB
pronouncements. Would the determinations of a governmental standard
setting group be solely concerned with fair and full disclosure and protec
tion of investors? Or would such determinations become infected with
other considerations? Would a governmental body have decided to re
quire a different approach to accounting for research and development to
assist small business without concern for the effect of such a determination
on investors in publicly held companies? (See p. 171 of the staff study,
where this is intimated.)
The Financial Accounting Foundation, the parent organization of the
FASB, has responded to the criticisms of the FASB. It has organized a
committee to examine the structure and operations of the Board. This
committee has interviewed extensively about 100 people who have had
experience with the financial reporting process—accountants, businessmen,
attorneys, government officials, educators, and many others—to secure a
clear notion of the manner in which the work of the FASB is perceived and
the ways in which it might be changed to better serve the public interest.
This committee expects to report by the end of April.
As stated earlier, since 1934 the standard-setting process has been sub
ject to the oversight of the SEC. An example of both the SEC’s willingness
to override pronouncements of the profession’s standard-setting body when
it thought such was appropriate and the hazards of expanding the control
of the federal government over the establishment of financial accounting
standards is seen in the lengthy controversy over accounting for the in
vestment credit.
The investment credit is a credit against income taxes of a percentage of
the purchase price of equipment purchased by a business. From its in
ception, controversy raged among businessmen and their accountants
concerning the manner in which this tax credit should be handled: Some
urged strongly that the effect on income should be spread over the life
of the equipment purchased, while others urged equally strongly that
the favorable effect on income should be reflected totally in the year of
purchase.
In December 1962, following the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1962,
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which included provision for the investment credit, the APB determined
that the fairest presentation to investors would be spreading the effect of
the credit over the life of the equipment. However, the SEC adopted a rule
that either method could be used by those filing documents with the SEC,
after which the APB retreated from its position and followed the SEC.
The controversy was rekindled in 1971 by the Revenue Act of 1971. This
act again provided for an investment credit. This time Congress pre
empted both the SEC and the profession by decreeing legislatively that no
one could require for the purpose of financial reports to any federal
agency the use of any particular method of accounting for the investment
credit. Thus, in the single instance in which Congress has decreed financial
accounting standards, it opted for the use of any of a variety of standards
(it did not even confine the options to the two most commonly used). Thus,
Congress encouraged the very practice of “principle shopping” that the
staff of the subcommittee has castigated the profession for failing to
eliminate: It permitted issuers to select from alternative principles the one
that would increase reported income.
The staff also makes much of the “flexibility” of accounting and implies
that a vast range of alternatives is available to management each year.
While some accounting alternatives exist, managements do not get to
pick and choose from alternatives each year as if from a menu. In the
unusual event of a change in accounting method, management must justify
the change as being to a preferable method and must spell out the full
effect in the financial statements and to the SEC.
There is no evidence in the staff study—unless speculation may be con
sidered evidence—that the present process, now less than four years old,
will not meet the needs of the users of financial information, will not
expeditiously reduce the accounting options available to corporations, or
will not promote the interests of investors better than any other system
that might be conceived. Notably lacking in the staff study and its appen
dixes are complaints from users of financial information.
The staff study criticizes the profession for its adherence to the stand
ard of “materiality”* (see p. 117 of the study) and charges that this
results in misleading financial statements, particularly those of large com
panies. The concept of materiality is imbedded in the statutes governing

* Materiality has been defined by the SEC in several rules, all of which are similar
to Rule 405 under the Securities Act of 1933:
The term “material,” when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of
information as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters
as to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed
before purchasing the security registered.
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financial disclosure and the rules of the SEC under those statutes. The
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 require the
disclosure of material information and predicate liability of various persons,
including the auditors, on a misstatement of or the omission to state, a
material fact. Furthermore, the courts, including the Supreme Court, have
made this concept the touchstone of their considerations of the adequacy
of financial statements and other disclosures.
The auditor must be guided by the determinations of the courts and the
SEC as to materiality. The concept is necessary to prevent financial state
ments from becoming overloaded with information of no use to those to
whom the statements are primarily directed—the investors. By thus avoid
ing such excess, the financial statements are more useful. Even as con
strained by this concept of materiality, financial statements of public
companies are often criticized for containing too much information, perhaps
thereby confusing investors.
If there were not such a concept as materiality to govern what should
and should not be included in financial statements, neither management,
nor auditors, nor courts would have any focus upon which to determine
what should, and what need not, have been included in financial statements.
Obviously, if an appropriate authority such as the SEC, the courts, or
Congress determines that auditors should follow a standard different from
that of materiality now imposed on them, they would make their judg
ments accordingly. But regardless of what label is put on it, any system
of disclosure must include a criterion to determine what should be in
cluded in financial statements; otherwise every snippet of paper a corpora
tion had would have to be published, resulting in nothing but confusion to
investors. It should be noted that the FASB has done an extensive study of
materiality, has published a discussion memorandum, and plans to issue
a standard on the subject.
The staff study (p. 185) contrasts the cost of operating the Cost Account
ing Standards Board with the cost of operating the FASB. This comparison,
of course, ignores a number of distinctions. First, the CASB is concerned
with establishing standards for one category of financial information,
namely, costs, while the FASB addresses itself to all categories of such
information—costs, revenues, assets, liabilities, and equity. Second, the
CASB is only concerned with setting these limited standards for a limited
group—certain government contractors; the FASB, on the other hand,
establishes standards for all businesses—not just for those with govern
ment contracts, not even just for those publicly held. The complexity and
scope of the FASB’s task compared with that of the CASB are apparent.
Finally, as seen earlier the output of the FASB in four years has far
exceeded that of the CASB in seven.
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In addition to the criticism of the FASB in the staff study, Senator
Metcalf’s transmittal letter states as one of his principal concerns the
delegation by the SEC of its authority over accounting and auditing
matters to “private groups.”
The Commission has allowed the accounting profession, and the bodies
the profession has organized, to take the initiative in establishing accounting
standards. This was done after considerable debate within the Commission
by the publication of Accounting Series Release No. 4, and was reconfirmed
in 1973, when the Commission issued Accounting Series Release No. 150,
by which it announced the policy of not recognizing principles which con
flict with pronouncements of the FASB, except in the unusual circum
stances—stated in Rule 203 of the Code of Professional Ethics of the
Institute—where the use of another principle is necessary to prevent the
statements from being misleading.
There is no evidence in the staff study, or elsewhere to our knowledge,
that would justify the conclusion that had the Commission not adopted
such a policy the quality of accounting and auditing would be different or
better. Furthermore, this relationship between the Commission and the
accounting profession has had the express or implied approval of chairmen
and commissioners since 1938 with no discernible objection, of all chief
accountants of the SEC since then, of virtually all preparers of financial
information and of virtually all users of information. In short, the belief
has been virtually universal that this relationship has been effective and
protective of the public interest.
This practice has of course had the advantage of using the talents and
experience of innumerable practitioners in the standard-setting process, at
a cost incalculable but very substantial. If the entire activity of the FASB
and its predecessors and the auditing standard-setting bodies had been
carried out by a governmental body, the taxpayers would have borne a
significant financial burden through the years.
However, this relationship has not by any means kept the SEC on the
sidelines. Since its inception it has published over 200 accounting releases
(78 of them since 1972); in late 1975 it commenced issuing staff in
terpretations based on experiences in processing filings with the Com
mission and inquiries from issuers and accountants, and thus far 14 have
been published; it adopted Regulation S-X, which sets forth requirements
with respect to the contents and format of financial statements filed with
the Commission by various types of enterprises and which it has con
tinuously amended to reflect changing needs. It is fair to say that the
Commission has by rule making, by enforcement activity, and in other
ways been quite aggressive in recent years in meeting its responsibility
with respect to accounting matters.
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Further, the Commission has maintained close liaison with the standard
setting bodies and has made known its views with respect to accounting
principles and auditing practices. This liaison has clearly influenced the
conduct of the private bodies.
The Commission and its staff have not been reluctant to take action when
they believed the action taken by the private bodies inappropriate or unduly
delayed. Thus in 1963 the Commission overrode the Accounting Principles
Board with respect to accounting for the investment credit. Again in 1973,
the Commission adopted disclosure requirements with respect to leases,
notwithstanding the issuance of an Opinion on the subject by the Account
ing Principles Board and the pendency of that matter on the agenda of the
FASB. In 1975, the Commission became aware that in many cases income
from early extinguishment of debt was unduly inflating the earnings of
some issuers because existing APB Opinions required it to be reported as
ordinary income. It urged the FASB to take action, suggesting that other
wise it would take action itself. The result was FASB Statement No. 4,
which satisfied the concerns of the Commission. Similarly, when in an
exposure draft the FASB appeared to favor price level accounting, the
Commission took steps to require disclosure in footnotes to the financial
statements of larger issuers of the replacement costs of inventories and fixed
assets to reflect the effects of inflation.
An example of the manner in which the FASB and the SEC interface,
and in which the SEC exercises its responsibility, is the release on Decem
ber 2, 1976, of FASB Statement No. 13, pertaining to the accounting for
leases. This provided for prospective application of its principles until
1981, when retroactive application will be required. The SEC is proposing
that these principles, which it implicitly endorses, be applied immediately
to practically all leases regardless of when they were entered into, thus
requiring the application of Statement No. 13 sooner than intended by
the FASB.
It is fair to say that the Commission and its staff have not been supine
or indifferent to the manner in which private bodies have dealt with
standard setting. To a greater extent than may appear from simply read
ing Accounting Series Releases Nos. 4 and 150, the Commission has
actively overseen the development of accounting and auditing standards.
2. Are present auditing standards and the process by which
they are established adequate for protection of the public?

(Recommendations 6, 7, 8, and 10.)
The staff study charges that the process of establishing auditing standards
has been dominated by the “Big Eight” and that the standards have not
been sufficiently rigorous.
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A critical distinction should be noted between auditing and accounting.
While intimately related, they are quite different. As mentioned earlier,
accounting is the process by which financial accounting standards are
applied to business transactions to produce financial statements. Auditing
is the process by which someone other than the preparer determines whether
the financial statements have been prepared in accordance with appropriate
accounting standards.*
Obviously someone performing the audit function must have an intimate
acquaintance with the financial accounting standards that were used in
preparing the financial statements under review; otherwise, he would be
unable to express an opinion that the statements were prepared in ac
cordance with standards indicated as having been followed. Also, there
is general agreement that for an auditor to perform his function effectively
he must become familiar with the enterprise whose statements are being
examined, particularly the system of internal accounting controls; the
adequacy of this system will in large measure determine the nature and
scope of the auditor’s procedures.
The auditing process consists of two parts: (1) Performing the various
procedures and tests necessary to form an opinion about whether the
financial statements are properly presented, and (2) reporting on the
financial statements as the result of that examination.
The standards by which independent auditors make their examination,
the procedures they use, and the contents of their report have evolved
over a period of time under the aegis of the committees of the Institute.
Ten basic generally accepted auditing standards are contained in Statement
on Auditing Standards No. 1 (in view of the staff study’s allegation that
the “Big Eight” dominate the establishment of standards, it should be
noted these most important basic standards were adopted by the member
ship of the Institute in the late forties). Interpretations of those standards
are proposed and adopted by the Auditing Standards Executive Com
mittee of the Institute as business and economic development require.
For instance, in response to a perceived need, the Committee has recently
issued two statements—one relating to the detection of errors or irregular
ities in financial statements and the other relating to illegal acts by
clients. Another statement has been proposed that would require the
auditor to inform management of significant weaknesses of internal
* A more technical definition is contained in Paragraph 110.01 of Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 1 published by the Institute in 1972:
The objective of the ordinary examination of financial statements by the inde
pendent auditor is the expression of an opinion on the fairness with which
they present the financial position, results of operations, and changes in financial
position in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
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accounting controls discerned during an audit, thus making mandatory a
practice now followed by most auditors.
The principal, though not the exclusive, purpose of the audit is to
express an opinion on the financial statements prepared by management,
thereby contributing to their credibility. Without the expectation that a
disinterested party would test the reliability of the statements, management
might be tempted to prepare its financial reports in a self-serving fashion.
Thus, the independence of the auditor is critical to the process.
Also of importance in conducting a proper audit are such matters as
the training of auditors, experience in performing audits, sufficient per
sonnel (often audits of large companies require hundreds of professionals),
supervision of the audit staff, controls to assure adherence to standards,
appropriate reviews by persons not involved in the actual audit work
itself, and other steps to remove as much as possible subjective elements
from the process and the report.
The auditor’s examination involves the use of various methods to
secure information concerning the numbers and explanations reflected
in the financial statements under review and the transactions which they
summarize. An auditor could review every transaction, regardless of size,
and obtain objective evidence of its elements—in effect, retrace trans
action by transaction the entire operations of the company for the period
under consideration. Obviously this would be inordinately expensive;
simply reflecting on what would be involved to review one’s own trans
actions during a year and to secure confirmation from external sources
that each was properly recorded on one’s financial records suggests what
an overwhelming task this would be for a large business enterprise.
To prevent audit costs from being grossly excessive in relation to
benefits, the accounting profession through the years has developed
various methods of testing the information reflected in the financial state
ments. These techniques, while not giving the same assurance as an audit
of every transaction, have provided in the combined experience of the
profession a high degree of assurance in determining whether matters
happened as represented. For instance, in testing the accuracy of accounts
receivable reflected in financial statements, a standard procedure is to
ask debtors whether the amounts shown on the books of the company
being examined are accurate. From experience, auditors know they will
not get a 100 percent response to confirmation requests; also, by ex
perience, they know that with a sufficiently high response, together with
other procedures, they may reasonably conclude whether the accounts
receivable figure is reasonably accurate.
Similarly, they observe the counting of selected inventory items. With
respect to reviewing some items, such as cash or marketable securities, a
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more reliable determination can be made, because of their nature, by actual
counts, or bank or depository confirmations.
Methods of external checking have been developed with respect to
virtually every item subject to such verification in financial statements.
If, as can be demonstrated, auditing standards have through the years
become increasingly demanding, how is it that there have been audits that
did not detect and report that the financial statements were not properly
prepared or properly reflective of transactions, that in some cases they
concealed illegal management conduct and even fraud?
First, of course, auditing is done by human beings and involves a
multitude of “judgment calls” with respect to such matters as classifica
tion of items, reasonableness of management estimates, bona fides of
transactions, and the like; hence, there is ever present in the auditing
process the danger of a human error, a mistake in judgment, a simple
oversight—errors that can occur, and do occur, in every profession and
every human enterprise and undertaking. While controls, training, and
supervision may reduce them, errors are always possible in human
endeavors.
In a number of cases, faulty financial statements resulted where auditing
procedures to identify and test certain types of transactions, such as
transactions between related parties, had not been developed because the
phenomenon had not been widely encountered or a source of misleading
financial statements; hence, individual auditors were not aware of the need
to search for such transactions. In every such case where it has appeared
that absence of sufficiently articulated auditing standards and procedures
has contributed to a problem, the Institute’s Auditing Standards Executive
Committee has actively considered and issued pronouncements to provide
the needed guidance. Even in the absence of business failures or mis
leading financial statements pointing to a problem, the Committee has,
relying on the combined experience of the members of the Institute, issued
pronouncements to head off possible problems.
However, of greater importance than human failure or a lack of stand
ards is the danger of deception practiced by unscrupulous managements
on the auditor in a way that defies discovery by even the most skilled
investigator. These deceptions have been present in several of the allegedly
“bad” audits.
The starting point of any audit is the books and records of the company,
although this is not the end point, by any means. Thus, to take the
simplest case, if a transaction was never entered on the books of the
company, the auditor might only become aware of it through happen
stance. In many cases, the misconduct which has been exposed was
committed completely outside the books and records of the company;
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hence, the auditor had no starting point. In other instances, the trans
actions were entered on the books, but the entry was misleading and
misrepresented the nature of the transaction. For example, a bribe to a
foreign official might have been labeled as a commission for sales services,
a fact that could not be apparent to the auditor unless he interrogated the
foreign official. Even then, he would not be likely to receive reliable
information from the recipient of a bribe. Of course, if management
colludes with a third party to mislead the auditor (as, for instance, by
causing third parties to give false responses to auditor inquiries), the
verification procedure is frustrated, and there generally is no practical way
available to the auditor to detect such collusion.
In short, management fraud and misconduct are rarely, if ever, apparent
on the books of the company. Artful entries usually are designed to have
the appearance of being routine and proper to escape the eye of the auditor.
In virtually every instance in which an auditor has been faulted, it has
been the consequence of financial statements improperly prepared by
management. In other words, the auditor, along with the investors, has
been the victim of a management fraud—misrepresentation by the man
agement of the company, deliberately concealed in some fashion from the
auditor.
Some of these falsifications could be detected if audit techniques were
extended beyond those now common. This would involve substantial
additional cost, leading to the critical question whether the additional cost
would be justified by the benefit to investors and creditors. Had procedures
more explicitly designed to determine whether the sort of misconduct that
has claimed headlines for the last two years been in use in the past, the
cost to American industry, and ultimately consumers, might have been
in the billions over the years. To date, out of some 10,000 companies
that report to the SEC, about 300 have disclosed improprieties, including
illegal or questionable payments. Some were not even clearly illegal or
improper. The primary issue, then, is not the failure of auditors; rather,
it is the cost American industry and American society are willing to bear
to procure the benefits that would derive from a significantly expanded audit.
The principal purpose of auditors, particularly those of publicly held
companies, is to provide an additional measure of credibility to financial
statements for the benefit of investors and creditors. If an auditor finds
evidence of illegality he has an obligation to apprise the appropriate people
within the company of such fact and consult with counsel concerning
possible other steps; if his legal duty is to inform others, then he must do
so. The notion, however, that the auditor’s primary function is the deter
mination of the extent to which the audited entity has conformed to law,
as suggested by the staff study, is indeed novel and at odds with the
26

entire history of auditing and the understanding of the business and pro
fessional community. The auditor is simply not equipped by professional
training or otherwise to make the sort of sophisticated legal judgments
such a distortion of his role would entail.
A number of projects are currently under way that will improve on
the effectiveness of audits:
1. During the last session of Congress, and again in the current one,
legislation has been introduced that would make it a criminal offense to
misrepresent to an auditor, to fail to maintain adequate internal controls,
to fail to maintain accurate books and records, and to falsify corporate
accounting records. The SEC has proposed similar requirements by rule
(Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-13185). It might be noted that
such requirements have been of long standing in other countries. For
example, it has long been unlawful in Great Britain to make misrepresenta
tions to an auditor. Obviously the dangers of criminal prosecution will
affect the conduct of management; to the extent it does, auditors will be
assisted and the effectiveness of audits will be improved.*
2. The Auditing Standards Executive Committee has adopted two
Statements (Statements on Accounting Standards Nos. 16 and 17) to
guide auditors in detecting and dealing with illegal conduct, management
fraud, and the like. While these pronouncements are criticized in the
staff study as inadequate, these criticisms are based on a misunderstanding
of matters in the proposed pronouncements that have been clarified in the
final pronouncements.
3. The Institute in October 1974 organized a commission under the
chairmanship of Manuel F. Cohen, a former chairman of the SEC, “to
consider how well independent auditors are meeting their present responsi
bilities, whether their responsibilities should be changed and how the
nature and limitations of those responsibilities can best be communicated
to users of the auditor’s work” (Statement of Issues: Scope and Organization

* The Institute has favored making it a criminal offense for persons associated with
a company under audit to misrepresent in writing a fact to an auditor; it opposed
those parts of the proposed legislation which would have made oral misrepresentations
criminal because of the uncertainties that attend such communications, and which
would have extended the prohibition to third persons because of the danger that fear
of criminal penalties would deter sources of information such as banks, debtors, and
others from supplying information to auditors on a voluntary basis as they now do.
The Institute believes the SEC’s proposed rule designed to accomplish substantially
the same results as the proposed legislation partially meets these concerns.
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of the Study of Auditors’ Responsibilities, p. 4). Only three of the seven
members of this commission are practicing accountants. The others are a
lawyer, a businessman, a financial analyst, and an educator. Notwith
standing that this commission had published nothing official beyond a
statement of the questions it proposes to address, the staff study rejected
the possibility that good will come from it (pp. 119-120). The contrary
may more confidently be asserted. Preliminary discussions with the
commission suggest that it will, indeed, recommend significant expansions
of auditors’ responsibilities and, given the times and the prestige and
origins of the commission, its recommendations will be taken very seriously
by the profession.
4. Virtually all firms, sensitive to the problems posed by the increasing
complexity of business transactions and the rising expectations of the public,
not to mention their own sense of professional responsibility, have tightened
their quality controls, their supervision, their training, and their overall
standards of performance. A random sampling of firms indicates that in
the last five years the expenditures of such firms for quality control and
training have at least doubled, while revenues from auditing have increased
by between 50 and 70 percent.
5. The Institute has established a procedure and program for review
of auditing firms by other auditing firms or by panels of other auditors
appointed by the Institute, of the adequacy of the reviewed firms’ controls,
supervision, and the overall manner in which they conduct their audits and
other activities. At this writing most of the large firms have arranged for
such reviews, and it is expected that many smaller size firms will undertake
such programs. The staff study seeks to disparage this program by stating
on pp. 114-115 that the review of one major firm which had been dis
ciplined by the SEC gave the firm a clean bill of health. The staff study
neglects to mention that the review followed by some three years the first
charge against the firm and that at least from the time of the first charge the
firm had undertaken extensive measures to avoid problems; knowing that,
it is not surprising that when the review was conducted it would justly
find that the firm’s standards and adherence to them were satisfactory.
Obviously a firm conducting a review of another firm undertakes a con
siderable responsibility, one which could result in severe consequences if
it concluded there existed no deficiencies in the examined firm and later
the conclusion proved to be wrong.
6. In almost half the states, legislation has been enacted, largely at the
instigation of the profession, requiring participation by accountants in
continuing education programs as a condition of retaining their licenses;
in all other states, the state CPA societies either favor such legislation or
have voluntarily adopted such programs.
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There is nothing in the staff study that would suggest that a governmental
body developing auditing standards could more effectively mandate good
supervision and control, thwart negligence and poor judgment, enforce
more diligently compliance with accepted auditing standards and pro
cedures, or deter more effectively management deception. An alerted
profession is expending a great amount of its resources toward these ends
and can be expected to continue to do this in the future. In fact, a govern
mental agency might be less effective, since it would not have as readily
available the experience of the profession in identifying problem areas.
Obviously, with the initiative and responsibility for the strengthening of
auditing standards in the private sector, auditors are more alert to their
responsibility to anticipate problems and, hence, are more willing to
cooperate with the standard-setting group in developing standards that
deal with potential problems.
3. Are auditors sufficiently independent of their clients?

(Recommendation 8.)
As mentioned above, integral to the effectiveness of the audit process is
the independence of the auditors. The staff study maintains that auditors
are not independent of their clients for two reasons: (1) They sometimes
perform services other than accounting and auditing for their clients, and
(2) they have testified in an advocacy role before Congress and other
governmental bodies in a manner favorable to their clients’ interests.
The standards for independence are established and enforced by the
Institute, the state boards of accountancy, the state CPA societies, and the
SEC. In addition to the standards established by such bodies, many firms
have additional procedures and rules governing permissible and impermis
sible relationships. These are rigidly enforced using very thorough and
sophisticated systems.
Independence essentially is a state of mind and not something that can
be measured with precision. The SEC in Accounting Series Releases (Nos.
2, 22, 44, 47, 81, 112, and 126) and the profession’s Code of Ethics and
attendant literature have articulated stringent standards proscribing certain
activities and relationships of auditors with clients. These standards serve
a twofold purpose: First, they prohibit relationships that might, in the
common experience of men, prejudice the judgment of an auditor; and
second, compliance with them provides some measure of external evi
dence that an independent relationship exists. Of course, notwithstanding
these strictures and their enforcement (the SEC has been extremely un
yielding in enforcing its requirements), it is possible for various reasons
that an auditor’s judgment may not be wholly objective. However, it is
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noteworthy that, with extremely few exceptions, the cases brought against
members of the accounting profession in recent years did not suggest the
slightest evidence that any auditor had any of the forbidden relationships,
had his judgment suborned by accepting any benefit from the client other
than customary fees, or had in any other way permitted his independence
to be impaired.
In the preparation and review of financial statements there are inevitably
going to be matters as to which reasonable men differ, and in the life of an
auditor there will be occasions when management personnel will for a
variety of reasons urge strongly on an auditor the propriety of their pro
posed accounting judgment as opposed to that which the auditor thinks is
right. These disagreements would exist even if every accounting principle
were clear, even if every situation were governed by a single principle, and
even if auditing standards and procedures anticipated every problem. Even
if the staff study’s recommendations were fully implemented, all elements
of judgment would remain, and there would continue to be questions such
as the estimated life of physical assets, the extent to which matters were
material, the allowances which should be made for bad debts, the account
ing period in which certain types of income should be recognized, and so on.
When disagreements arise between management and the auditors, they
are sometimes resolved in a manner that is satisfactory to both parties.
This is not, as suggested by some, prima facie evidence of a lack of in
dependence on the part of the auditor; it is almost invariably the con
sequence of deeper inquiry by the auditor into the facts, and thoughtful
response by both parties to persuasive arguments.
Notwithstanding a praiseworthy record of independence, various
measures are being taken to strengthen even further the independence of
auditors:
1. The SEC requires that when there has been a change of auditors,
there must be disclosure in a filing with the Commission of any disagree
ment between the auditor and management over an accounting principle or
practice, financial statement disclosure, or auditing procedures (Item 4,
Form 8-K). Thus, a management may no longer dismiss an auditor o ver
an accounting disagreement with no publicity other than the presence of a
different auditor’s opinion in the next annual report. These filings are
often discussed in the press. Obviously this requirement strengthens con
siderably the ability of auditors to withstand management pressures.
2. The increased incidence of litigation has unquestionably caused
auditors to be more sensitive to the dangers of succumbing to pressures
from management. With increasing numbers of investors alert to possible
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deficiencies in financial reporting, every auditor realizes that the penalties
for any departure from sound standards or any subordinating of judgment
to that of a client may entail not only financial loss to his firm, but also
professional disaster for himself and possibly criminal prosecution and even
(as happened in a case recently) imprisonment.
3. The SEC has increasingly monitored the adequacy of audit per
formance and brought injunctive and administrative proceedings when it
believed there had been shortcomings in the work of auditors. In recent
years, the Commission has more frequently named accountants and ac
counting firms in injunctive actions and in administrative proceedings to
determine whether they should be allowed to continue to practice before
the Commission. Also, the discipline of litigation is not confined to the
SEC. During this period, many suits were brought in the United States
charging accounting firms with deficiencies in their professional work.
Quite obviously the overhanging threat of SEC or private party litigation
is a strong influence in directing the profession toward more stringent stand
ards of independence, competence, and adherence to sound practices.
4. Increasingly, companies have set up audit committees as a part of the
structure of their boards of directors. Such committees usually consist
exclusively of outside directors. A recent report summarized in the Wall
Street Journal (January 19, 1977, p. 6) stated that in the past five years,
among 646 companies surveyed, the number with audit committees had
increased from 42 percent to 93 percent. It is noteworthy that in 1967,
long before the current concern with this question, the Institute recom
mended that companies establish independent audit committees.
The audit committee performs several functions. It provides a means by
which the auditors can discuss candidly with outside directors problems they
have discerned in the company, the quality of internal controls, pressures
from management, improper conduct they have found, and anything else
they think may affect the financial statements of the company. The members
of the audit committee have the opportunity to assess the competence of the
auditors, the adequacy of their procedures, and the strength of their in
dependence. Both directors and auditors have expressed satisfaction with
the functioning of these committees, and the evidence is persuasive that the
presence of an audit committee in a company strengthens considerably the
audit function and the independence of the auditors.
The importance of audit committees is underlined by the request of SEC
Chairman Roderick M. Hills to the New York Stock Exchange that it
modify its listing requirements to compel listed companies to have in-
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dependent audit committees. In that letter, dated May 11, 1976, Chair
man Hills said:
The existence of an audit committee that meets privately with the outside
auditors to discuss the scope of the audit, questions arising during the
audit, including disputes with management, and that has access to the
corporate financial information, is an important part of our effort to
maintain the credibility of our system o f corporate self-regulation.

In response to this request the Exchange has adopted an amendment to
its listing agreement requiring that after July 1, 1978, each listed company
have an audit committee consisting of directors independent of manage
ment.
5.
As discussed above, firms have strengthened and are continuing to
strengthen their internal procedures to assure the quality and independence
of their auditing work.
The staff study asserts that the independence of accounting firms in per
forming audits is compromised because they render various consulting
services to their clients in addition to accounting and auditing. Not only is
independence not compromised, but in many cases the quality of the audit
is enhanced. Often the performance of these services provides the firm
with a better understanding of the company, the adequacy of its internal
controls, the calibre of personnel, and other information which assists
materially in the auditing process. Further, there is not in the staff study
the slightest evidence that these activities have in any way actually affected
the quality of financial reporting or the independence of any auditor.
The staff study charges that lack of auditor independence is further
evidenced by the fact that accountants often testify before public bodies
advocating positions that are favorable to their clients. Sometimes ac
countants testify explicitly at the request of clients. However, their testi
mony is the fruit, not of a client interest, but of a conviction born of
experience and professional insight. When they so testify they are not
tools of their clients. Clients are by no means homogeneous in their
opinions on any subject; hence, quite often a CPA’s expressed opinion may
parallel the opinion of some clients but offend others. Therefore, the
charge that they do this as advocates of client interests rather than from
convictions concerning the issues is without basis in fact.
It is not surprising that in many instances professionals deeply concerned
with financial matters would find their own views corresponding to those
of some of their clients; to suggest that because they have such clients
they should remain silent concerning issues about which they have expert
knowledge is not only to deny them basic rights but also to deny public
bodies the benefits of their expertise. The implication of the staff study
would seem to be that, under the changes recommended, accountants
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would no longer be allowed to express their opinions on matters they
deem of public concern or that might affect them or their clients, a
restraint we suggest Congress would be loath to impose.
4. Are the Institute and the accounting profession
dominated by the large accounting firms?

(Recommendations 4 and 12.)
The staff study asserts that, by their domination of the Institute, the
“Big Eight” dominate the FASB and the senior and other committees of
the Institute. The charge of domination of the Institute is based on the
assertion that, while CPAs associated with “Big Eight” firms are only 15
percent of the membership of the Institute, their participation on Institute
committees is much higher. The relevant facts are considerably different.
Among the members of the Institute only about 75,000 are engaged in
practice; of these, about 27 percent are affiliated with “Big Eight” firms
and about 33 percent are associated with the 15 firms discussed in the
study. These statistics are roughly in the same proportion as representation
on the Institute’s Council, its ultimate policy-making body, in which “Big
Eight” members are less than one-third, and the 15 largest firms’ members
number about two-fifths; and on the Institute’s Board, in which “Big
Eight” members are one-third.
It also is not surprising that the large firms participate in some of the
activities of the Institute more actively than other accountants. Large pub
licly held companies, while sharing some problems and concerns with
privately held enterprises, tend to have the full range of accounting and
auditing problems, including some which are unique to themselves. Thus, it
is to be expected that accounting firms which audit publicly held companies
would be more willing to commit their personnel and their resources to the
activities and committees of the Institute most concerned with those prob
lems. Furthermore, because of their size and internal research capabilities,
those firms tend to be better equipped to commit manpower to this effort
than firms with smaller staffs.
Finally, to the extent that the large firms influence the activities of the
Institute and its committees, nowhere in the staff study is there evidence
that this has been adverse to the development of sound accounting and
auditing standards or the public interest. There is no evidence that had
the participation of large firms in the Institute been confined to an amount
exactly proportionate to their membership, accounting principles and
auditing standards would be any better; a sounder argument can be made
that they would not have been as good because of the lesser availability
of the personnel and other resources of the large firms which assist the
work of the committees and the Institute.
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The simple fact is that the “Big Eight” are eight distinct firms who seldom
speak with a single voice. An examination of the firms’ submissions to the
FASB, the Auditing Standards Executive Committee, and the SEC in
response to proposals by those bodies shows dramatically the varying views
and approaches among the firms, often concerning very basic issues.
Similarly, the suggestion that the large firms dominate the FASB through
the Institute is belied by the fact that the Institute, like innumerable others
interested in financial accounting standards, routinely submits responses to
the FASB’s discussion memoranda and exposure drafts which are often
at variance with the comments of the “Big Eight” firms. A comparison
of those submissions with the final opinions of the FASB shows that often
the suggestions and criticisms of the Institute are rejected by the FASB!
Clearly, if the Institute were the minion of the “Big Eight” and the FASB
were the slave of the Institute these divergences would not occur.

5. Are present standards for determining the liability of auditors
to public investors fair and sufficiently protective?

(Recommendation 3.)
The staff criticizes the recent Supreme Court decision, Hochfelder v.
Ernst & Ernst, and calls for its legislative reversal. In that case the Court
held that for an auditor to have liability under Rule 10b-5 (the SEC’s
rule prohibiting fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative activity), it must be
shown that his conduct was worse than negligent; it must be shown that
he had an intention to deceive, defraud, or manipulate.
First, it should be noted that this decision has no effect whatsoever on
the liabilities that relate to the registration of securities under the Securities
Act of 1933 for the purpose of public distribution; under that act auditors
may still be held liable if they fail to establish that “after a reasonable in
vestigation, [they had] reasonable ground to believe and did believe” that
the financial statements included in a registration statement on their
authority did not contain any materially false statement or omit any
material fact required to be stated in the registration statement or necessary
to make the statements made not misleading.
If an auditor knowingly participates in a client’s fraud, or, according to
some courts of appeal since the Hochfelder decision, if the auditor is
reckless, he may have huge liabilities to investors. Thus, the auditor con
tinues, even under Hochfelder, to have a significant exposure to liability.
For example, recently the liability of the auditors in the Equity Funding
matter was settled—after the Hochfelder decision—for $39 million.
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Hochfelder did not determine the
extent of the fault necessary to sustain a complaint by the SEC. Since
Hochfelder, several courts of appeal have concluded that simple negligence
is sufficient to sustain a complaint by the SEC alleging violation of the
securities laws. Such actions, which can culminate in damaging injunctive
relief, can have a profound impact on the reputation and prospects of an
accountant and accounting firm.
Beyond that, when the question is not one of liability of the auditor to
purchasers of securities in a registered offering, but rather the extent to
which he should be liable to the vast number of people who trade securities
in the market, there is a considerable question of equity and fairness.
The simple issue is this: Is it equitable, is it good policy, to subject an
auditor to huge, perhaps even ruinous liabilities, as the consequence of a
single negligent act? Accounting firms perform thousands of audits a year
(over 10,000 audited financial statements are filed with the SEC annually,
and it is estimated that the “Big Eight” conduct more than 65,000 audits
annually). With only a few exceptions, these have provided significant
protection to investors, creditors, and others who have the need to rely on
them. Is it appropriate—is it fair—to make an accounting firm, made up of
literally thousands of professionals, answer for the huge damages that may
accrue as the consequence of the negligence of only one or a very few
members of the firm?
The answer to this question was well stated by Judge (later Supreme
Court Justice) Benjamin O. Cardozo in Ultramares v. Touche, decided by
the New York Court of Appeals:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure
to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may
expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an inde
terminate time to an indeterminate class. . . . The hazards of a business
conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether
a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these
consequences.

Interestingly, the proposal to make harsher the liability exposure of
auditors belies the concerns expressed by the staff report about an alleged
lack of competition in the profession. The harsher the liability standards,
the less able are small firms to bear the risk attendant upon an audit.
How many small firms could suffer a $39 million settlement, even if
covered by insurance, and survive? Small firms report that they have
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increasing difficulty in securing adequate insurance because they are not
well known and do not have the resources of large firms. Thus, harsher
standards of liability may further force publicly held corporations to
engage the larger firms.

6. Is there excessive concentration in the supply of auditing and
accounting services to large publicly owned corporations?

(Recommendations 4 and 12.)
The staff study suggests that accounting practice is too concentrated in
the larger firms and that the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department should investigate this matter.
Modern economic history, both in this country and abroad, has been
characterized by the growth in size of corporations; the reasons for and
social desirability of that growth are beyond the scope of this discussion.
The growth of accounting firms has paralleled that corporate growth for
a simple reason: To audit a major international industrial company requires
a large organization. For instance, the audit of General Motors requires
examination of records and other procedures to be done in approximately
200 major accounting locations of which 150 are in this country and 50
are outside the United States. Even for a much smaller company, the
auditor must conduct audits at dozens of locations in this country and
overseas. Most firms having clients with operations widespread geograph
ically have expanded their activities correspondingly, in large measure
to maintain the efficiency, consistency, and quality of their audit. Simply
put, most small firms, confronted with the audit of a major company,
would not have the resources to do the work.
Thus, it is not surprising that as corporations have grown, auditing firms
have grown, and those structured to meet the needs of large companies have
attracted large clients.
The remedies suggested by the staff study for the alleged concentration
would in many cases diminish the quality of the audit and increase audit
costs substantially. It is suggested that the auditing firms be rotated
periodically. At the present time it is common practice for firms to rotate
the personnel involved in an audit to assure fresh insights and preclude
the development of relationships that might impair independence of judg
ment. However, this is done in a manner that preserves the important
continuity of knowledge of the company, its history, its personnel, and
its audit problems. Understanding of the company, its internal controls,
the way it keeps its books, its policies, and its personnel, is universally
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regarded as essential to the satisfactory performance of the audit. For
instance, an authoritative work on auditing states:
The integrity and reliability of presentations in financial statements
depend primarily on two things: (1) the effectiveness of the company’s
accounting systems and the controls over them and (2) the fairness of its
management’s estimates, valuations, and judgments reflected in the state
ments. Thus, an auditor must understand not only a client’s accounting
systems, but also enough about the client’s operations, management, and
econom ic circumstances to be able to judge the fairness o f estimates,
valuations, and other judgments made. He must understand at least
the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Accounting systems in use.
Systems of internal control.
Accounting principles used.
Characteristics of the operations of the client company that could have
a financial or accounting impact.
5. Management policies and practices that could affect the reliability of
financial and accounting controls and decisions.
6. Characteristics of the business environment that could affect financial
statements.
7. Legal constraints, both present and potential, within which the enter
prise must function (Montgomery’s Auditing, 9th ed., p. 6).

If auditors were rotated periodically, each firm new to a client would
be at a disadvantage because of its lack of familiarity with the client and
its financial practices and would need considerable time to achieve the
knowledge of the company possessed by the replaced auditor. It is surely
not without significance that in a large number of the suits which have
involved auditors, the relationship between the auditor and the client had
been of relatively recent origin. Rotation would deny the auditor the
very valuable tool he acquires as he achieves familiarity with a corporation,
its procedures, and its people. Furthermore, each time a firm is changed,
there is the additional expense of the auditor’s familiarizing himself with
the client and its procedures, an expense which would have to be borne
by the client (ultimately, of course, by the public).
Increasingly the selection of auditors is being delegated to audit com
mittees, which usually consist either entirely, or almost so, of outside
directors. The staff study suggests that shareholders elect auditors by voting
on competing firms. However, an audit committee, in continuous contact
with the auditors, will obviously be in a far better position to judge the
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auditor’s performance than shareholders who would have a very limited
basis on which to compare the current auditors of the corporation with a
possible replacement.
Finally, contrary to the staff study’s charges about concentration, the
number of smaller firms in which Institute members practice has in the last
six years increased from about 9,500 to about 16,000.

7. Is the disciplinary process that impacts the accounting
profession sufficient?

(Recommendations 8 and 14.)
The staff study criticizes the profession for not being harsh enough in
disciplining members of the accounting profession for misconduct.
With respect to the Institute’s disciplinary proceedings, several circum
stances must be borne in mind. The Institute is composed entirely of
individuals; firms are not eligible to be members. Hence, its powers as a
private organization are limited to members, and the Institute can only
bring proceedings against, and impose sanctions on, individuals.
Second, the Institute, unlike public bodies, has no subpoena powers, no
right to force people to testify, no right to demand the presentation of
documents; it can, of course, impose penalties, such as suspension from
membership, for failure to cooperate with a proceeding, but often impor
tant evidence is in places and hands other than those of members and is
thus unavailable to the parties.
Third, the desirability of prompt action against errant members must
be weighed against concerns for fairness. Usually, when allegations of
improper or inadequate work by an auditor are made, the matter quickly
becomes involved in civil litigation or SEC disciplinary proceedings, or
both, or, less frequently, criminal proceedings (regardless of Institute action,
of course, such proceedings, no matter what the outcome, have a remedial
effect surely as effective as disciplinary proceedings). If the Institute sought
to determine whether disciplinary measures should be taken before the
proceedings pending in court or before the SEC were concluded, the
evidence adduced in its proceedings and the conclusions reached would
undoubtedly be used against the persons or firms involved in court.
Conversely, if the determination were favorable to the member, they
would undoubtedly be used in his favor. Similarly, the documents
developed in the course of the proceeding would be subject to subpoena.
Inasmuch as the standards which would be applied in a disciplinary pro
ceeding to determine whether sanctions should be imposed and the rules
for the introduction of evidence might differ markedly from those which
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would apply in a proceeding before a court or the SEC, the use of such
proceedings, their outcome, or any documents or testimony elicited in the
course of them in other proceedings could work a distinct hardship on one
side or the other in the litigation.
To avoid such a prejudice to parties, the Institute has had the practice
of listing for ultimate determination any matter where it appeared at the
commencement of or in the course of a legal proceeding that a member
of the Institute might have been guilty of actionable conduct. The mat
ter is kept on the list until a final determination is made about it. Thus,
on the current list of the Institute there are 162 matters related to cases
pending in court or before the Commission. Each of them will be sub
ject to active investigation when the litigation is ended or the statute
of limitations has expired. Because of the protracted nature of proceedings
in court, many of these matters have been pending for long periods of
time. Given the desire of the Institute to avoid the prejudice which might
accrue to a party in litigation if it conducted its proceedings while litigation
was pending, there is no means of avoiding the appearance of undue delay.
Of course, the Institute, which can, at most, expel a member from a
voluntary organization, is not the only instrument for discipline in the pro
fession. Disciplinary matters are also handled by the state boards of
accountancy, since they are the only governmental authorities which license
accountants and which can effectively suspend or terminate an accountant’s
right to practice. In addition, the SEC, through administrative and injunc
tive proceedings against accountants, exercises substantial disciplinary
power over accountants involved with financial statements filed with the
SEC. Thus, in considering the effectiveness of discipline of the profession,
the entire skein of governmental, legal, and private discipline must be
considered rather than a single strand standing alone.
Finally, of course, discipline is only one part of a total self-regulatory
scheme which involves much more than simply punishing errant members.
The accounting profession establishes educational and testing standards,
which are stem and demanding, for admission to the profession and the
right to practice; it establishes and enforces standards of independence;
increasingly it requires continuing education as a condition to the right
to practice; it establishes the rules governing how financial statements
must be prepared and how they must be examined by auditors. Compliance
with this variety of standards is in significant measure enforced by the
profession. However, courts have frequently used them as measures of
the adequacy of an accountant’s performance, implicitly affirming by so
doing, that the standards themselves are sufficient to protect the public
interest.
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8. Should the federal government refuse to engage for
consulting work all firms that do auditing work for the government?

(Recommendation 13.)
The staff study recommends that the federal government engage to do
accounting and auditing work only firms which do not render consulting
services to the government. This, of course, is predicated upon the false
notion discussed above that there is a threat to auditor independence
when a firm does consulting work for an audit client. Contrary to this
assertion, the fact is that such services afford the auditing firm an added
opportunity to gain the knowledge and insight necessary for the best
performance of auditing services. Further, it is obvious that performing
consulting services for one agency of the government would not impair
independence in an audit of another agency.
Professional services are rendered with varying degrees of competence.
We would suggest that the public interest is best served if consultants are
selected in each case on the basis of their respective competences for the
work to be done; if an auditing firm is capable of rendering the best
consulting work in a given area, the public would suffer by refusing the
work to that firm because of an arbitrary rule excluding such firm because
it also did auditing work for the government.

CONCLUSION
We submit that the foregoing analysis establishes clearly that the account
ing profession is fully able to provide reasonable protection to the public
in its reliance on audited financial statements. The adoption of the recom
mendations of the staff study would, in truth, hinder achievement of that
objective and frustrate efforts now firmly under way, rather than further
the protection of the public.
We urge that the Congress reject the staff study recommendations which
would fasten on the auditing profession, and American business, an un
necessary, unwarranted, and undesirable governmental burden.
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